As a public administration practitioner and researcher engaged in international trade governance, I have been closely following the evolution of technical barriers to trade (TBT) and their profound impacts on China’s strategic emerging industries. My research journey has led me to a focused inquiry: how can we better organize our collective governance capabilities to safeguard the international market position of the EV battery pack industry? This question becomes increasingly urgent as the global regulatory landscape shifts beneath our feet. The formal entry into force of the *EU Regulation on Batteries and Waste Batteries* in August 2023 marks a watershed moment, demonstrating how TBT measures are evolving to include carbon footprint requirements, digital product passports, and stringent due diligence obligations. This chapter of my research addresses these challenges through the lens of multi-stakeholder collaborative governance.
1. Introduction and Research Context
The global push toward carbon neutrality has accelerated the transition to electric mobility, making the EV battery pack the single most critical component in the automotive value chain. The term ‘EV battery pack’ refers to the complete assembled unit that stores and delivers electrical energy to propel an electric vehicle. According to data from SNE Research, Chinese manufacturers dominated the global landscape in 2023, with CATL securing a 36.9% global market share and BYD following at 15.8%. My country’s production scale has remained the world’s largest for years, and lithium-ion batteries have become one of the “new three” export products, contributing over 1% of total national export value. Riding on this wave of expansion, the industry nonetheless confronts the sophisticated and increasingly intrusive expansion of green trade barriers.
The research questions that have driven my work are these: What specific shortcomings exist in our current institutional arrangements for TBT responses in this vital sector? How can we leverage collaborative governance to overcome these institutional deficiencies? In what ways can we improve the overall policy ecosystem, given the escalation of protectionist tendencies among Western economies?
2. Literature Foundation and Theoretical Framework
2.1 Profile of TBT Research
Technical Barriers to Trade encompass technical regulations, standards, and conformity assessment procedures that can impede the free flow of goods across borders. The literature generally agrees on their dual nature: on one hand, they legitimately protect human health, safety, and environmental integrity; on the other hand, they create hidden obstacles to international trade due to their inherent complexity and relative opacity. Maskus and Wilson have demonstrated that TBT measures raise the export costs, thereby weakening the competitive position of foreign producers. Several researchers have further explored the trade effects through the lens of free trade agreements, while studies on regional agreements highlight the growing collaborative dimension in TBT provisions across major economies.
Recent scholarship on international comparisons indicates that the EU and the US have established elaborate institutional systems around TBT notification, inquiry, and dispute resolution, with better embedded technical coherence. My country’s approach has remained relatively fragmented across multiple agencies, including the General Administration of Customs, the Ministry of Commerce, the State Administration for Market Regulation, and the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology. The literature points to the necessity of better harmonization across agencies and more effective coordination with industry and academia.
2.2 The EV Battery Pack Industry
The concept of the EV battery pack refers to an integrated system that encompasses the necessary components, such as cells, thermal management systems, battery management units, and structural containment. The industry’s global expansion has been nothing short of explosive. China’s growth owes much to policy support since the early 2010s, culminating in its current status as the world’s largest producer of lithium-ion cells.
Nevertheless, several structural weaknesses have emerged. These include high reliance on imported minerals: lithium, cobalt, and nickel. Table 1 below summarizes the import dependency features of these critical minerals.
| Mineral | Global Reserve Share (%) | Import Dependence (%) | Major Suppliers | Main Risk |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lithium | 7.0 | ≈ 65-70 | Australia, Chile, Argentina | Supply chain concentration and price volatility |
| Cobalt | 1.0 | ≈ 90+ | DR Congo, Australia | Geopolitical risk and ethical sourcing concerns |
| Nickel | 3.0 | ≈ 95 | Indonesia, Australia, Brazil | Export controls in source nations |
In addition, the industry is constrained by transport limitations—Chinese railways currently do not allow the transport of EV battery pack via the China-Europe Railway Express due to outdated and overly cautious hazardous goods regulations, significantly increasing logistics costs for exporters such as CATL. Furthermore, battery recycling channels remain fragmented, with unregulated “small workshops” competing against qualified, compliant recyclers, undermining both the security of recycled materials and the integrity of the entire battery life-cycle management value chain.
2.3 Collaborative Governance Theory
The theory of collaborative governance, particularly its multi-stakeholder variants, highlights the importance of shared public value and networked decision-making processes. The main concepts are summarized in Table 2.
| Dimension | Core Principle | Application in TBT Resistance |
|---|---|---|
| Pluralism of actors | Government and non-government stakeholders share deliberative and decisional space | Customs, ministries, industry associations, enterprises, research institutions |
| Public issue orientation | Cooperation addresses a recognized public problem | Mitigating external commercial constraints while promoting the low-carbon transition |
| Consensus orientation | Finding and articulating shared values | Aligning security of supply chains and industrial development goals |
| Institution-building requirement | Stable rules enable continuous cooperation | Creating permanent coordination structures and monitoring benchmarks |
My earlier academic and professional work has convinced me that the theoretical constructs of collaborative governance offer a powerful lens through which we can identify gaps in the present TBT response system and design robust institutional improvements.
3. Methodology
In carrying out this research, I adopted a multi-method approach combining qualitative and quantitative analyses. First, I conducted a comprehensive desk review of international and national policy documents, legislation, technical standards, and industrial reports. Secondly, I conducted one-on-one interviews with officials from public authorities, specialists from national TBT research centers, industry representatives from prominent enterprises, and associations of the power battery sector.
To further substantiate my findings, I designed two distinct questionnaires. The first targeted EV battery pack producers and relevant export firms. The second targeted public institutions at different levels — including customs authorities, industry and information technology commissions, market supervision administrations, and economic development zones. The survey was implemented between August and December 2023. I utilized a dual approach of descriptive statistical analysis and exploratory factor analysis to ensure the validity and reliability of the measurements.
Table 3 reports the survey validation results.
| Questionnaire Type | Sample Size | Cronbach’s α | KMO Value | Statistical Significance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprises (Appendix A) | 160 | 0.746 – 0.818 | 0.510 | p < 0.05 |
| Public institutions (Appendix B) | 105 | 0.773 | 0.601 | p < 0.05 |
4. Multilateral Challenges: TBT Evolution and Industry Impact
4.1 Driving Forces Behind Modern TBT Expansion
The drivers of the current wave of TBT measures are complex and structural. From my perspective, three main factors stand out: geopolitics, technological change, and the shift toward industrial policy. OECD reports and EU regulatory initiatives show that these market interventions are no longer mere safeguards for consumer safety, but are integrated components of wider industrial strategies.
Geopolitical competition has resulted in trade blocs with decreased dependencies on Chinese supply chains. The US Inflation Reduction Act, passed in 2022, obstructed Chinese electric vehicle and EV battery pack makers by imposing content requirements and partner-country sourcing standards. The European Union, in turn, has leveraged its environmental agenda to introduce strong protectionist components. Tariff-based barriers are now accompanied by non-tariff measures that include:
– Carbon border adjustment mechanisms (CBAM)
– Forced labor due diligence rules
– Supply chain transparency and digital traceability obligations
| Driving Factor | Manifestation in EV Battery Pack Trade | Implication for China |
|---|---|---|
| Geopolitics | Exclusionary arrangements, persistent anti-subsidy investigations | Higher market entry barriers, potential structural exclusion |
| Technological leap | Standardization on carbon-intensive measurement and battery passport protocol | Shortened competition cycle, tougher sanctions against leakage |
| Environmental policy | Green taxonomy, carbon footprint thresholds, recycled content requirements | Increased compliance burdens, urgent need for greener supply chain |
4.2 Case Study: EU Battery Regulation 2023/1542
As my analysis will demonstrate, the EU Regulation (EU) 2023/1542 has altered the regulatory environment beyond recognition. It replaces the 2006 Directive and institutes a single set of requirements: the entire EV battery pack must now abide by carbon declarations, performance grades, and maximum thresholds, with accompanying conformity markings. The phased timeline is shown in table 5 below.
| Year | Requirement Imposed | Impact Assessment |
|---|---|---|
| 2024 – 2025 | Carbon footprint declaration | Requires LCA data and standardized metrics |
| 2026 – 2027 | Carbon footprint performance classes; maximum lifecycle thresholds | Constrains high-carbon energy mix in production |
| 2027 – 2028 | Battery passport mandatory | Reveals sensitive data across the whole value chain |
| 2031 – 2036 | Recycled content minimum quotas | Affects access to secondary raw materials |
The methodology of carbon footprint calculation has been specifically contested. The Regulation adopts the product environmental footprint (PEF) methodology, which is not mutually recognized by Chinese authorities. This lack of equivalence creates legal uncertainty for exporters. My research identified that many enterprises lack the technical capacity to conduct the required life-cycle assessments.
Another key requirement is the collection mechanism for discarded batteries. Producers placing batteries on the EU market — regardless of origin — must register as producers and comply with extended producer responsibility (EPR) obligations. They must organize establishment of waste collection plans, take-back schemes, and reporting systems. For remanufacturing or repurposing, stringent traceability protocols are mandatory.
Importantly, the rule on disclosure and the “battery passport” introduces significant data security risks. Core data such as the cell chemistry, performance parameters, state of health, and detailed supply chain relations can be publicly accessible, creating vulnerabilities for Chinese enterprises that have mastered cutting-edge technologies.
4.3 Structural Weaknesses of the Chinese EV Battery Pack Industry
My research into current production mechanisms has uncovered multiple weak points:
1. Carbon verification deficiencies: There is a lack of a standardized domestic methodology to track carbon emissions across the lithium-ion battery life cycle. One significant problem is that green power — such as hydroelectricity or wind power — is not typically traced through the purchase of green certificates to final use in the EV battery pack manufacturing plants. In addition, the emission factor for grid electricity, which is essential to carbon audits, has not yet been mutually recognized with European practices. A unique emission-factor database has not yet been constructed.
2. Shortages of traceable secondary materials: The EU planned recycled content mandate meets a systemic obstacle at home. Because residual battery packs frequently end up with uncertified recyclers — a phenomenon often called ‘the bad money drives out the good’ — the certified recyclers lack a sufficient stream of used batteries to recover high-grade cobalt, nickel, and lithium. At the same time, the current classification under the *Prohibited Imported Solid Waste Catalog* prevents the importation of used EV battery pack units into China. This was a crucial finding from my interviews: overseas recycled battery content cannot return into the supply chains that require it, creating a non-compliance trap for Chinese producers operating under European regulation.
3. Intellectual property exposure: Under the battery passport requirement, each unit must transmit battery-specific data into a European digital registry. However, the legislation deliberately makes much of this data visible to national authorities, notified bodies, and other third parties. There is a serious risk that Chinese proprietary cell design and materials formulations might be reverse-engineered and disseminated. These types of risks are not fully appreciated abroad, and are insufficiently addressed by Chinese industrial security frameworks.
4. Uneven compliance costs for SMEs: Large corporations possess the resources to adjust and verify their environmental and social governance disclosures. Small and medium-sized battery component suppliers, who are key upstream participants in the battery supply chain, are significantly lagging in technical and financial capacity. In my research sample, 70% of survey respondents considered carbon footprint a major threat to their sustainability. Transport constraints via rail and lack of accreditation protocols further complicate market access.
5. Identification and Analysis of Governance Gaps in Current Responses
5.1 Existing Institutional Framework
The current administrative structure is spread across several ministries and agencies. Table 6 details the key public actors and the nature of their involvement.
| Agency | Core TBT role | Main Weakness |
|---|---|---|
| General Administration of Customs (GACC) | National TBT/SPS enquiry point, notifications, alert and response | No formal cross-sector coordination mandate outside its functional scope |
| Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) | International trade negotiations, handling disputes and WTO representation | Late entry into technical details, potential policy mismatches |
| State Administration for Market Regulation (SAMR) | Standards development, certification and accreditation policy | Slow standardization lifecycle, limited ability to harmonize with ISO/IEC at required scale |
| Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) | Industrial policy, formulation of technical guidance, corporate social responsibility supervisory authority | Not formally involved in TBT coordination, except on an ad-hoc basis |
| Industry associations | Informational conduit, feedback collection, support to firms | Uneven capacities; insufficient binding authority over members |
These structures have not evolved into a unified inter-agency coordination body akin to the EU’s DG GROW mechanism or the US system coordinated by the International Trade Administration. Ad-hoc coordination mechanisms, such as inter-ministerial joint conferences, have proven insufficient for dynamic and fast-moving TBT cases.
5.2 Empirical Findings from Questionnaires and Interviews
The quantitative analysis pointed to significant gaps in inter-agency cooperation. When enterprise respondents were queried about which government departments they expected to support them, two or more departments were cited in 90% of all responses. Figure (table 7) summarizes their perceptions of whether interdepartmental cooperation is necessary and what its quality is.
| Question Items | Enterprise Responses (%) | Public Sector Responses (%) |
|---|---|---|
| Coordination is ‘needed’ or ‘strongly needed’ | 91 | 86 |
| Existing coordination is ‘average’ or lower | 74 | 69 |
| Need for one-stop public information platform | 71 | 80 |
| Acceptance of joint value proposition | 76 | 68 |
The empirical data clearly suggests the existence of three major problems: first, the fragmentation and inconsistency of information sources; second, the absence of formal communication channels; third, deficiencies in the scope of cross-border regulatory cooperation.
5.3 Core Governance Deficiency
Despite decades of international integration, TBT responses still operate in a traditional pillar-based model. There is no cross-sector steering body, no fixed organizational framework, and no centrally coordinated strategy for developing globally aligned standards. The result is duplication of effort, inconsistent messaging, and delayed responses to overseas notifications.
6. Root Cause Analysis from the Collaborative Governance Perspective
6.1 Divergent Value Orientations
The primary root cause that emerged is the divergence in the public value orientation of key stakeholder groups. In the context of the TBT response, administrations such as customs, commerce, industry, and market supervision essentially have varied core functions and do not naturally align on the linkage between their daily operations and overall industrial competitiveness or international strategy. This divergence was confirmed through interviews and survey answers: a significant portion of public officials felt they only had to gather opinions, showing lower collaborative awareness.
6.2 Ambiguity of Institutional Mechanism
It was established through documentary research that there is no permanent focal point. Government agencies share responsibility without well-specified terms of reference. This leads to accountability loopholes: some tasks fall between their institutional roles, while other authorities may “overlap,” creating inter-agency tension. Important deadlines, such as TBT notification periods of 60 days, tend to be missed due to unclear allocation of tasks. Without established administrative supervision mechanisms, staff may not feel the need to deliver to cross-agency performance metrics. Therefore, my study emphasizes the need for a legal, institutionalized mandate for collaboration.
6.3 Fragmented Policy Tools
The current toolkit — standard setting, certification, trade promotion, technical assistance — is disjointed. Most notably, my research indicates that Chinese standards have limited international outreach; they are not being exported or aligned sufficiently with partner countries under Belt and Road initiatives. Table 8 illustrates the gap between China and more established systems with respect to main cooperative devices.
| Cooperative Instrument | EU Strategy | US Strategy | Chinese Current Practice |
|---|---|---|---|
| Permanent interagency working group | Yes, DG GROW and DG TRADE | Yes, ITA led | No standing group; case-by-case coordination |
| Integrated information systems | Access2Markets, Single Entry Point | Standards portal, enforcement database | Multiple incompatible portals with low visibility |
| Funding support to stakeholders | Yes, assistance schemes | Yes, Market Development Cooperator Program | No dedicated funding or budget line |
| Standards export | Active, via technical assistance programs | Active, via standardization partnerships | Limited and fragmented |
The data from my case interviews at the firm level illustrates the consequences of these deficiencies: lower responsiveness to foreign regulation and lost export revenues. Table 9 provides a snapshot of the main consequences observed.
| Observed Consequence | Specific Manifestation in EV Battery Pack Business | Projected Cost Increase |
|---|---|---|
| Higher transportation costs | Inability to use rail transport on China-Europe lines | >¥32 million per enterprise per year |
| Compliance re-verification | Need for jurisdiction-specific re-testing and certification | +10% to 20% in overhead costs |
| Supply chain restriction | Difficulty importing recyclable materials from abroad | Threat of non-compliance with recycled content threshold |
| Data protection burden | Investment in secure data storage and compliance systems | 5% – 8% increase of administrative budget |
Overall, the analysis leads to a clear recommendation: strengthening the institutional system of multi-actor cooperation is no longer an option but a necessity.
7. International Benchmarking for Evolving Solutions
7.1 Comparative Analysis of EU and US Systems
My examination of foreign TBT response systems shows that both the EU and the US are characterized by effective management of collaborative networks, robust feedback channels, and efficient technical assistance.
The EU operates a centralized system that is led by the Commission. Its strengths include rapid information flows and provision of access to regulated markets for small and medium-sized businesses. On the other side, the United States offers clear and detailed information about how industry can influence TBT decisions. The mechanisms include the Trade Policy Review Committee, the Committee on the WTO, and a dedicated TBT coordination mechanism under the USTR. These mechanisms systematically incorporate private-sector input.
Perhaps the most relevant attribute, however, is proactiveness. US and EU agencies do not simply respond to other nations’ regulatory measures — they actively promote their own standards at the WTO, in bilateral trade agreements, and through targeted technical assistance programs directed toward developing nations. This not only improves market access but also strengthens their standard-setting positions globally.
7.2 Valuable Lessons for the Chinese Regulatory System
First, the principle of a “single window” — a unified point of access for TBT information — is proven to be a successful method of ensuring stakeholders do not get lost in a maze of fragmented governmental portals. Second, a stable inter-agency committee with rotating secretarial function but central coordination responsibility is very important. Third, the support of professional third-party organizations must be systematic and sustainable. Fourth, consistent technical capacity-building efforts for under-resourced agencies are required.
8. Policy Proposals: Toward a Multi-Actor Collaborative System
Given the above findings, I structure my recommendations in three dimensions: value coherence, institutional coherence, and technical coherence.
8.1 Value Coherence: Balancing Security and Development Goals
The success of any collaborative governance scheme depends on agreement on underlying values. The TBT response system cannot be exclusively guided by protectionism or economic isolation; nor can it give up the autonomy approach in standard setting. Instead, we must balance the objective of guarding national security and industrial safety with supporting the high-quality development of China’s high-tech sector.
In my proposal, the first task is to mainstream the importance of the TBT domain at the level of all public institutions. This means that trade technical affairs are not merely a customs housekeeping matter; they should be recognized as an integral part of national foreign and security policy. Through a national strategic plan on technical trade measures, we would send a clear signal about the importance of cross-sectoral collaboration. To achieve this, a value alignment document or charter that is approved by the State Council and jointly endorsed by all the relevant ministries and public entities should be proposed. The charter would explicitly prioritize safety and sustainability, focusing on alignment with the “dual carbon” national goal, and strike an equilibrium between industrial protection and open trade policy.
8.2 Institutional Coherence: Building a Standing Coordination Structure
A regular, standing institution should replace the currently ad-hoc working groups. This structure could be called the National Technical Trade Measures Coordination Committee, under the State Council, with a permanent secretariat perhaps housed in a customs or commerce department. Its tasks would include:
| Function | The Main Content |
|---|---|
| Designing strategic orientation | Elaborating and updating a multi-annual national strategy for TBT containment and exploitation |
| Operational supervision | Formulating an annual action plan for inter-agency tasks and evaluating progress against measurable performance metrics |
| International coordination | Building and consolidating cooperation frameworks and mutual recognition agreements with trading partners |
| Data Integration | Overseeing the establishment of a single information platform that will integrate existing portals |
| Resource allocation | Managing specific budgets to support the participation of enterprises, trade associations and academics |
The dedicated inter-agency body should be supported by technical subcommittees, each dealing with product-specific sectors. In the case of the EV battery pack, there should be a special battery working group that brings together customs, MIIT, SAMR, Ministry of Ecology and Environment, and the Standardization Administration.
To strengthen accountability, performance measurement should include the number of timely notifications reviewed, the degree of industry involvement, the number of TBT issues resolved, and the satisfaction level of enterprises. Clear metrics must be defined:
$$ \text{Index of TBT Collaboration} = \frac{N_{coordinated}}{N_{total}} \times 100\% $$
where \(N_{coordinated}\) is the number of TBT notifications that involve integrated inputs from at least three institutional actors, and \(N_{total}\) is the total number of relevant notifications received in that reporting year.
In addition, administrative incentives and a system of periodic inter-agency audits should be introduced, ensuring that the mechanism is continuously updated and that responsible staff members are duly recognized or, where warranted, subject to corrective guidance.
8.3 Technical Coherence: Establishing a Public Information Infrastructure
In order to eliminate fragmentation, the central action is to develop a national “TBT response digital platform” that functions as a single, authoritative gateway. The platform would provide:
– instantaneous alerts on regulatory changes;
– access to full texts or summaries of technical statutes and standards;
– digital templates for supplying comments on foreign notifications;
– training module repositories;
– searchable databases with comparative analysis of domestic and overseas requirements.
The platform architecture is represented by the following formula:
$$ E_{platform} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} \alpha_i \cdot C_i}{T_{access}} $$
where \(E_{platform}\) denotes the overall effectiveness of the public information infrastructure, \(\alpha_i\) are the weight coefficients for each function (e.g., early warning, comment collection, notification tracking, document search), \(C_i\) is the usage rate or content completion of function \(i\), and \(T_{access}\) expresses the average time for stakeholders to load or retrieve the required information. The goal is to raise usage rates and lower access time through the design of a user-oriented platform.
With respect to technical tools, a great emphasis should be placed on interoperability. The platform must build an interface with internationally recognized systems, including the ePing SPS and TBT notification system of the WTO and various national enquiry points. That interoperability reduces delays and increases the chance of responding within the 60-day comment window.
Moreover, I recommend incorporating AI-based data-mining capabilities into the public platform that can filter announcements and regulations based on HS codes, keywords, and specific markets. This kind of smart-alert software could read across millions of documents each week, recognizing relevant patterns for EV battery pack exporters within seconds.
| Phase | Feature | Timeline |
|---|---|---|
| Short Term | Create a single portal merging existing customs and MOC websites | Within 12 months |
| Medium Term | Include AI-enabled automated notifications and translation/interpretation modules | Within 24-36 months |
| Long Term | Fully integrated expert analytical hub for technical assistance on key sectors including EV battery pack | Within 5 years |
At the industry level, a “closed-loop” mechanism should be created for gathering technical feedback from businesses. This would include periodic consultations, public hearings, and structured methods for collecting comments from industry associations. In this respect, genuine openness from enterprises is essential for an effective response strategy.
9. Priority Actions for the EV Battery Pack Sector
In light of the urgency and strategic value of the EV battery pack industry, the following targeted policy actions are presented in table 12.
| Recommendation | Lead Actor | Supporting Bodies | Expected Outcome |
|---|---|---|---|
| Develop national LCA methodology for EV battery pack carbon footprint and seek EU mutual recognition | SAMR/MIIT | GACC, research institutes, industrial bodies | A credible national calculation platform, bridging the existing divergence from PEF methodology |
| Adjust list of import controls to allow controlled entrance of qualified retired battery modules | MIIT | MOFCOM, GACC, Ministry of Ecology and Environment | More predictability for supply chain of secondary battery materials, making recycled content easier to satisfy |
| Accelerate implementation of uniform, mandatory battery traceability system across the internal market | MIIT | SAMR, local governments, customs authorities | Minimizing informal recyclers and boosting efficient collection streams |
| Secure technical safeguards for intellectual property under battery passport disclosure requirements | MOFCOM/GACC | Ministry of Justice, data protection authorities, industry bodies | Reduced vulnerability to economic espionage while respecting international transparency requirements |
| Promote the alignment of Chinese standards with the upcoming ISO/Battery passport framework to reduce the risk of standards capture | SAMR | MIIT, sectoral standards associations | Increase global interoperability and unlock possibilities for future standards equivalence |
| Support development of green power traceability and PPA frameworks to lower the carbon footprint of domestic battery production | National Development and Reform Commission and National Energy Administration | MIIT, local governments and state grid | Direct reduction in reporting values for product carbon footprint calculators |
Besides the regulatory actions above, the operation of numerous public-private cooperation bodies should be reconsidered. In particular, the “New Energy Vehicles Technical Barriers to Trade Research Base” established by the GACC and located in Guangzhou could serve as a model for more task-specific public-private partnerships. It now needs strengthening — its own standardized gateway and collection mechanisms have been under-utilized. My recommendation is to elevate such bases to nationally recognized collaborative platforms.
10. Conclusion
The conclusion of my analysis can be succinctly summarized. The era of passive and compartmentalized response to foreign Technical Barriers to Trade has passed. As power battery demand shifts globally toward carbon-free economies and the EV battery pack becomes a cornerstone of trade, more intrusively crafted regulations will not disappear. Instead, the trend will be defined by lower carbon restrictions, more digital surveillance, and greater state participation in industrial governance.
My research has verified the value of Collaborative Governance Theory in shaping effective and sustainable TBT responses. The collaboration among different participants should be understood not as a zero-sum negotiation but as a process to unlock new resources, build trust, improve capacity, and realize common objectives.
I have accordingly proposed a systemic transformation of current TBT management, based on three integrated pillars:
– First, value coherence through a guiding strategic framework that firmly embeds TBT sophistication in the country’s wider foreign-economic and security outlook;
– Second, institutional coherence through a permanent coordination mechanism accompanied by a robust administrative supervision mechanism and incentives system;
– Third, technical coherence through the development of an integrated public interest platform, plus targeted responses specific to EV battery pack export chains, such as full traceability and mutual recognition mechanisms.
If implemented, these steps will effectively help safeguard the international position of the EV battery pack industry while supporting the country’s broader goals of high-quality economic growth, dual-carbon transition, and the building of a modernized and open governance structure. The recommended framework will also be a helpful reference for many other strategic manufacturing industries that face the evolving landscape of global technical regulation.
My research has limitations — particularly with respect to the dynamic nature of geopolitical conditions and the continuous introduction of new policies. Nevertheless, I trust that this study offers both theoretical and practical insights into the critical intersection of trade regulation and governance and provides a launching pad for new discussions, further empirical validation, and future cooperative networks. Strengthening a governance landscape that reconciles the security of supply chain, digital sovereignty, and industrial future is not an option — it is the defining task of our time.