Because of the strong growth of the automotive sector, the dramatic increase in petroleum demand and exhaust emissions has intensified both environmental stress and the energy crisis. As the shift from fuel-powered vehicles to electric cars spreads on an enormous scale, the promotion of electric cars has become a central element in the global effort to achieve carbon-peaking and carbon-neutrality targets. Electric cars not only diversify the energy mix and reduce the transport sector’s dependence on petroleum, but also lower carbon emissions and encourage green mobility. However, during the diffusion of electric cars, hidden dangers such as battery fire and charging malfunction have caused public anxiety, and this safety concern has become one of the factors that most seriously prevents the adoption of electric cars.

Manufacturers have reacted by investing heavily in battery technology in order to improve the safety and reliability of electric-car batteries. In practice, three battery R&D modes are prominent. First, an electric-car manufacturer may develop the battery in-house; BYD’s second-generation blade battery is an example, with improved energy density and substantially lower thermal-runaway risk. Second, a battery supplier may conduct R&D independently; CATL’s Qilin battery uses a new electrolyte and a composite separator and significantly reduces the probability of thermal runaway. Third, the manufacturer and the supplier may share the R&D effort; Tesla and Panasonic jointly developed the 4680 battery, which uses silicon-based anode material and improves both range and thermal stability.
In the meantime, consumer safety anxiety has changed the market competition between electric cars and fuel cars. Because the battery is expensive, an electric car is usually sold at a higher price than a comparable fuel car. In early market phases, the electric-car maker acts as a price leader and sets a high price. When safety incidents lower demand, many electric-car manufacturers begin to follow fuel-car prices and reduce their prices, triggering the observed “price war” in the Chinese automobile market. Some fuel-car manufacturers, by contrast, respond with higher prices rather than price matching, hoping that a high-price strategy protects their brand image and product competitiveness. These observations motivate the two research questions analyzed in this article: how should manufacturers and suppliers choose their battery R&D modes, and how should electric-car manufacturers set prices when consumers exhibit safety anxiety?
1. Related Literature
This article is related to three streams of literature. The first stream discusses the promotion of electric cars. Studies have identified consumer psychological factors, technology perception, environmental concern, charging infrastructure, and government subsidies as important determinants of electric-car adoption. For example, consumer attitudes toward perceived usefulness and ease of use of green technology are positively associated with the intention to use electric cars. Other papers use game theory to optimize charging station location, battery stock, and charging/swapping service fees. However, these papers rarely connect battery safety perceptions with the R&D decision of the supply chain.
The second stream examines R&D decisions in the electric-car supply chain. One group studies government subsidies and the dual-credit policy; another group studies whether firms choose independent R&D or collaborative R&D. Some empirical studies show that technological capability and market power are key drivers of R&D mode choices. A general conclusion is that collaboration is favored when the expected R&D success rate is high or when supply-chain coordination is beneficial. Nevertheless, most analytical studies concentrate on policy tools or contract forms. The effect of each member’s R&D capability on the R&D-mode decision is not yet fully addressed, especially when the R&D objective is to improve battery safety and to alleviate consumer anxiety.
The third stream deals with pricing strategies for electric cars. In this stream, scholars have studied the effect of charging anxiety, range anxiety, resale anxiety, low-carbon awareness, and brand competition. Several papers construct consumer utility functions and solve price equilibria under different supply-chain power structures. A common finding is that consumer anxiety suppresses demand and thus affects the manufacturer’s optimal price. Only a small number of papers incorporate battery safety into the pricing model. Therefore, from the perspective of consumer safety anxiety, this article studies the price leadership/followership choices of electric-car and fuel-car manufacturers.
2. Battery R&D Mode Selection
2.1 Model Setting
I consider a supply chain consisting of one electric-car manufacturer \(M\) and one battery supplier \(S\). The manufacturer procures battery packs from the supplier and assembles the packs into electric cars. Three R&D modes are analyzed. In mode \(I\), the manufacturer invests in battery R&D by itself; in mode \(O\), the supplier undertakes the R&D investment; in mode \(C\), the two firms jointly invest and share the cost. The R&D cost contains a fixed investment \(\mu \theta_i^2\) and a variable resource cost that increases with the expected R&D time. The development time is uncertain, and the R&D rate decreases in the target innovation level. The investment of firm \(i\) is \(\theta_i\), and the research capability of firm \(i\) is \(\lambda_i\). I denote the manufacturer’s capability by \(\lambda_M\) and the supplier’s capability by \(\lambda_S\).
The demand for electric cars depends on the sale price and the achieved battery-safety level. In the cooperative mode, the total innovation input is the sum of the manufacturer’s and supplier’s efforts, so the demand function is
\[
D_C=1-p_C+\theta_M+\theta_S.
\]
In the manufacturer’s self-development mode and the supplier’s development mode, demand is, respectively,
\[
D_I=1-p_I+\theta_M,\qquad D_O=1-p_O+\theta_S.
\]
Let \(c_B\) be the unit production cost of the battery pack, and normalize the electric-car assembly cost to zero. The sequence of decisions is as follows. First, the manufacturer and supplier choose their R&D investments. Second, the supplier decides the wholesale price \(w\). Third, the manufacturer decides the retail price \(p\). All proofs are conducted by backward induction.
The profit functions in the three modes are summarized as follows. In the self-development mode \(I\):
\[
\pi_{MI}=\mathbb{E}\left[(p_I-w_I)D_I-\mu\theta_M^2-\frac{k\theta_M}{\lambda_M}\right],
\]
\[
\pi_{SI}=(w_I-c_B)D_I.
\]
In the supplier-development mode \(O\):
\[
\pi_{MO}=(p_O-w_O)D_O,
\]
\[
\pi_{SO}=\mathbb{E}\left[(w_O-c_B)D_O-\mu\theta_S^2-\frac{k\theta_S}{\lambda_S}\right].
\]
In the cooperative mode \(C\):
\[
\pi_{MC}=\mathbb{E}\left[(p_C-w_C)D_C-\mu\theta_M^2-\frac{k\theta_M}{\lambda_M}\right],
\]
\[
\pi_{SC}=\mathbb{E}\left[(w_C-c_B)D_C-\mu\theta_S^2-\frac{k\theta_S}{\lambda_S}\right].
\]
The first-order optimality conditions generate the equilibrium prices and R&D levels. For the manufacturer self-development mode, the optimal retail price satisfies the best-response function
\[
p_I=\frac{1+w_I+\theta_M}{2},
\]
and the wholesale price response is
\[
w_I=\frac{1+c_B+\theta_M}{2}.
\]
For every mode, the closed-form equilibrium solutions are algebraically involved; therefore, the main comparative results are presented rather than the full expressions. The following parameter restrictions ensure positive output and positive profits in all modes:
\[
0<\mu<\frac{1}{16},\qquad 0<\lambda_M<\frac{16k}{1-16\mu}.
\]
2.2 The Manufacturer’s Optimal R&D Strategy
I first compare the manufacturer’s equilibrium profit under the three modes. Let \(\pi_{MC}\), \(\pi_{MI}\), and \(\pi_{MO}\) denote the manufacturer’s profit in the cooperative, self-development, and supplier-development modes. The comparison leads to Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. The manufacturer’s preferred R&D mode depends on the supplier’s capability and its own capability.
(i) If the supplier’s capability is low, that is,
\[
0<\lambda_S<\frac{4k}{1-4\mu},
\]
then the manufacturer cooperates with the supplier when its own capability is low; otherwise the manufacturer chooses self-development.
(ii) If the supplier is sufficiently capable, that is,
\[
\frac{8k}{1-8\mu}<\lambda_S<\frac{8k}{1-8\mu?},
\]
the manufacturer may prefer cooperation at low self-capability, delegate R&D to the supplier at an intermediate self-capability, and self-develop at a high self-capability.
Proposition 1 reveals a non-monotone pattern. When the manufacturer’s own R&D capability is weak, the best way to obtain a safe battery is to cooperate with the supplier. Cooperation enables the manufacturer to share R&D cost and to combine complementary technologies. When the supplier’s capability is low while the manufacturer’s capability is high, the manufacturer prefers independent R&D, because a weak supplier cannot offer enough technical support. In the intermediate region where the supplier is capable but the manufacturer is not yet able to develop independently, delegation to the supplier becomes attractive. This conclusion differs from a conventional “make-or-buy” rule because battery safety is a strategically critical technology.
2.3 The Supplier’s Optimal R&D Strategy
From the supplier’s perspective, I compare \(\pi_{SI}\), \(\pi_{SO}\), and \(\pi_{SC}\). The result is stated in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. The supplier’s preferred R&D mode is determined by the manufacturer’s R&D capability and the supplier’s own R&D capability.
(i) When the manufacturer’s capability is low, the supplier prefers cooperation if its own capability is low and prefers independent R&D if its own capability is high.
(ii) When the manufacturer’s capability is high, the supplier prefers cooperation at low self-capability, prefers that the manufacturer performs R&D at an intermediate self-capability, and prefers independent R&D at high self-capability.
The supplier always benefits from cooperation when both parties are weak, because cooperation lowers the financial burden and increases the chance of a successful safety innovation. With greater own R&D capability, the supplier can capture all of the innovation rent by developing independently. In asymmetric situations, the supplier sometimes prefers the manufacturer-led R&D mode even if the supplier itself is capable. The reason is that a capable manufacturer can improve battery demand, which in turn increases the supplier’s battery-pack sales.
2.4 Consensus and Win-Win Zones
Combining Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 gives the conditions under which the two chain members agree on the same R&D mode. Let \(\lambda_M^1, \lambda_M^2, \lambda_M^3, \lambda_S^1,\lambda_S^2,\lambda_S^3,\lambda_S^4\) be thresholds defined in the proof. The main result is stated in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. There exist win-win regions in the parameter space \((\lambda_M,\lambda_S)\).
(1) Manufacturer self-development is unanimously chosen when the supplier is weak but the manufacturer is sufficiently strong, or when both capabilities are high but the manufacturer’s capability exceeds a threshold.
(2) Supplier development is unanimously chosen when the manufacturer is weak and the supplier is sufficiently capable, or when the supplier’s capability is above a threshold even if the manufacturer is also capable.
(3) Cooperative R&D is unanimously chosen only when both the manufacturer and supplier have low R&D capability.
These consensus regions are depicted conceptually in Table 1.
| Manufacturer capability \(\lambda_M\) | Supplier capability \(\lambda_S\) | Equilibrium R&D mode |
|---|---|---|
| low | low | Cooperation (win-win) |
| high | low | Manufacturer self-development (win-win) |
| low | high | Supplier development (win-win) |
| intermediate | high | Supplier development or manufacturer self-development |
| high | high | Manufacturer self-development |
The intuition is clear. Cooperation is not always a “best” solution. In equilibrium, cooperation works as a risk-sharing device only when neither party has enough capability to conduct R&D alone. When one party is sufficiently strong, that party should lead the R&D project; otherwise the stronger party’s marginal contribution is diluted.
2.5 Numerical Illustration
I calibrate the model using industry data. The unit battery cost is \(c_B=0.7\), the fixed cost coefficient is \(\mu=0.035\), and the variable cost coefficient is \(k=0.03\). Parameter values are set so that the feasible conditions are satisfied. Table 2 reports the effect of the manufacturer’s capability on supply-chain profits under self-development and cooperation.
| \(\lambda_M\) | \(\pi_{MI}\) | \(\pi_{SI}\) | \(\pi_{MC}\) | \(\pi_{SC}\) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0.50 | 0.016 | 0.096 | 0.017 | 0.033 |
| 0.60 | 0.021 | 0.161 | 0.009 | 0.022 |
| 0.70 | 0.029 | 0.289 | 0.005 | 0.016 |
| 0.80 | 0.041 | 0.591 | 0.003 | 0.013 |
| 0.90 | 0.066 | 1.544 | 0.001 | 0.011 |
Table 2 shows that, under self-development, both the manufacturer’s and the supplier’s profits increase with the manufacturer’s R&D capability. Under cooperation, however, both profits decrease with the manufacturer’s capability. A high-capability manufacturer that cooperates with a lower-capability supplier bears a disproportionately large share of the R&D burden and receives lower profit. Table 3 shows similar results with respect to the supplier’s capability.
| \(\lambda_S\) | \(\pi_{MO}\) | \(\pi_{SO}\) | \(\pi_{MC}\) | \(\pi_{SC}\) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0.16 | 0.029 | 0.026 | 0.008 | 0.037 |
| 0.20 | 0.054 | 0.035 | 0.005 | 0.016 |
| 0.24 | 0.118 | 0.051 | 0.003 | 0.007 |
| 0.28 | 0.387 | 0.093 | 0.002 | 0.003 |
| 0.30 | 1.025 | 0.152 | 0.002 | 0.002 |
I also extend the model by letting the demand sensitivity to in-house R&D differ from the sensitivity under cooperation. The qualitative conclusions remain unchanged. When the consumers value collaborative R&D more, cooperation appears more attractive, but the fundamental role of R&D capability is unaffected. Consequently, the mode-selection rule derived in this article is robust.
3. Pricing Strategy under Consumer Safety Anxiety
3.1 Consumer Utility and Demand
In the second research question, I consider a duopoly market in which a fuel-car manufacturer \(O\) competes with an electric-car manufacturer \(E\). Let \(p_o\) be the fuel-car price and \(p_c\) the electric-car price. The electric car has an additional unit production cost \(c_c\), while the fuel car’s production cost is normalized to zero.
Consumers evaluate electric cars by four attributes: driving utility \(e_u\), low-carbon utility, purchase price, and battery safety. When battery-safety concern is present, the utility obtained from driving an electric car is discounted by a safety factor \(\theta\in(0,1]\). A higher \(\theta\) means that consumers trust the safety of electric-car batteries to a greater extent. Let \(u_g\) be the consumer’s low-carbon preference, uniformly distributed on \([0,1]\). Then the demand system can be written as
\[
q_c=1+(1-\theta)e_u-p_c+p_o,
\]
\[
q_o=(1-\theta)e_u-p_o+p_c.
\]
The electric-car manufacturer’s profit is
\[
\pi_c=(p_c-c_c)q_c,
\]
while the fuel-car manufacturer’s profit is
\[
\pi_o=p_o q_o.
\]
Three market games are considered: simultaneous pricing, an EV-led Stackelberg game in which the electric-car manufacturer moves first, and an oil-led Stackelberg game in which the fuel-car manufacturer moves first.
3.2 Equilibrium Pricing Outcomes
Using backward induction, I derive the equilibrium prices. The simultaneous equilibrium is characterized by the two first-order conditions. Solving the two equations yields the equilibrium prices shown in Table 4. The table also reports the outcomes under the two Stackelberg leadership structures.
| Game structure | Electric-car price \(p_c\) | Fuel-car price \(p_o\) |
|---|---|---|
| Simultaneous | \(p_c^S\) | \(p_o^S\) |
| Electric-car leader | \(p_c^L\) | \(p_o^F\) |
| Fuel-car leader | \(p_c^F\) | \(p_o^L\) |
I use these equilibrium values to investigate the leadership preference of each manufacturer. Define the thresholds
\[
\theta_1=\frac{u_e-c_c-1}{2u_e}, \quad
\theta_2=\frac{u_e-c_c+1}{2u_e}, \quad
\theta_3=\frac{7u_e+\sqrt{17}u_e-c_c}{7u_e},
\]
and require \(c_c>3u_e+1/3\). The equilibrium of the two-stage leadership game is characterized in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4. The optimal price-leadership decisions depend on the safety-sensitivity parameter \(\theta\) and the production cost of the electric car.
(i) For a low production cost, when \(\theta_2<\theta<1\), both “lead” and “follow” can be optimal; that is, \((L,L)\) and \((F,F)\) are both equilibria. When \(\max\{\theta_1,\theta_3\}<\theta<\theta_2\), the unique equilibrium is \((F,L)\); the electric-car manufacturer follows while the fuel-car manufacturer leads.
(ii) For a high production cost, when \(\theta_1<\theta<\theta_3\), \((L,L)\) is the equilibrium.
Proposition 4 provides a clear interpretation. If consumers are not very concerned about battery safety, i.e., \(\theta\) is close to one, the two manufacturers are symmetric in terms of safety perception. In that regime, being a leader or a follower is equally acceptable: a leader enjoys a first-mover advantage, whereas a follower can exploit the information revealed by the leader and undercut the price. If consumers are more concerned about safety, the fuel-car product has a perceived advantage. The fuel-car maker prefers to lead and charge a relatively high price; the electric-car maker prefers to follow and use a low price to compensate for safety anxiety. When the electric-car production cost is high, following is no longer sufficient to recover cost, and the electric-car maker chooses to lead together with the fuel-car maker, using price as a strategic signal of quality.
3.3 Introducing a Safety Warning System
Many electric-car manufacturers now invest in a safety warning system that continuously monitors battery states and sends an alarm before thermal runaway. Such an investment can mitigate consumer safety anxiety. Let \(T\) denote the investment level and let \(\beta\) be the cost coefficient. The profit of the electric-car manufacturer becomes
\[
\pi_c=(p_c-c_c)q_c-\frac{1}{2}\beta T^2.
\]
The demand for electric cars is augmented by the safety warning service:
\[
q_c=1+(1-\theta)e_u-p_c+p_o+T,
\]
\[
q_o=(1-\theta)e_u-p_o+p_c-T.
\]
Solving the same three games with the modified demand system yields Proposition 5.
Proposition 5. When a safety warning system is introduced, the leadership preference depends on both \(\theta\) and \(T\).
(i) If \(\theta_2<\theta<1\), then both manufacturers are willing to enter the market either as price leaders or price followers.
(ii) If \(\theta_0<\theta<\theta_2\), both firms prefer \((L,L)\) when the investment level is sufficiently large, and \((F,L)\) when the investment level is intermediate.
(iii) If \(\theta_0<\theta<\theta_3\) and the investment level is low, the electric-car maker participates as a leader together with the fuel-car maker.
The safety warning system changes the strategic incentive of the electric-car maker. A high investment \(T\) raises consumer trust and expands the demand for electric cars. The electric-car maker can then lead the market without suffering from anxiety-driven demand loss. When \(T\) is too low to fully reassure consumers, the electric-car maker is better off as a price follower, undercutting the fuel-car price. In contrast, when \(T\) is very low and consumers are relatively anxious, an EV leader strategy may be optimal because the small market share can be compensated only by a high margin.
3.4 Demand Comparison
The next proposition compares the market demand for electric cars with that for fuel cars under different games.
Proposition 6.
(1) In the simultaneous game, fuel-car demand is always larger than electric-car demand whenever \(\theta<1\).
(2) In the oil-led Stackelberg game, electric-car demand is larger than fuel-car demand when \(\theta\) is sufficiently high; otherwise the fuel-car demand dominates.
(3) In the EV-led Stackelberg game, a similar threshold structure applies.
The intuition is that when the safety factor is high, battery anxiety is weak. The electric-car maker can exploit price advantages and obtain a larger market share. When the safety factor is low, even a price follower cannot fully offset the consumer’s safety concern, and fuel cars retain the demand advantage.
3.5 Numerical Analysis
I calibrate the pricing model with typical values: \(c_c=0.2\), \(e_u=3.8\), and \(\theta=0.7\). Tables 5 and 6 show how the safety sensitivity \(\theta\) affects equilibrium prices and profits.
| \(\theta\) | \(p_c^S\) | \(p_o^S\) | \(p_c^L\) | \(p_o^F\) | \(p_c^F\) | \(p_o^L\) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0.45 | 0.103 | 1.097 | 0.055 | 1.073 | 0.378 | 1.645 |
| 0.60 | 0.293 | 0.907 | 0.340 | 0.930 | 0.520 | 1.360 |
| 0.75 | 0.483 | 0.717 | 0.625 | 0.788 | 0.663 | 1.075 |
| 0.90 | 0.673 | 0.527 | 0.910 | 0.645 | 0.805 | 0.790 |
As consumer safety sensitivity increases, electric-car prices and profits improve, while fuel-car prices and profits decrease. This result is intuitive because a higher \(\theta\) reduces the psychological damage caused by the risk of battery accidents. The profit comparison is presented in Table 6.
| \(\theta\) | \(\pi_c^S\) | \(\pi_o^S\) | \(\pi_c^L\) | \(\pi_o^F\) | \(\pi_c^F\) | \(\pi_o^L\) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0.45 | 0.009 | 1.203 | 0.011 | 1.150 | 0.032 | 1.353 |
| 0.60 | 0.009 | 0.822 | 0.010 | 0.865 | 0.102 | 0.925 |
| 0.75 | 0.080 | 0.514 | 0.090 | 0.620 | 0.214 | 0.578 |
| 0.90 | 0.224 | 0.277 | 0.252 | 0.416 | 0.366 | 0.312 |
Table 7 reports the effect of the safety-warning investment \(T\) on equilibrium prices, with fixed safety sensitivity. A higher \(T\) raises electric-car prices and lowers fuel-car prices because the warning system differentiates the electric car by improving perceived safety.
| \(T\) | \(p_c^S\) | \(p_o^S\) | \(p_c^L\) | \(p_o^F\) | \(p_c^F\) | \(p_o^L\) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0.50 | 0.570 | 0.630 | 0.755 | 0.723 | 0.728 | 0.945 |
| 1.00 | 0.720 | 0.480 | 0.980 | 0.610 | 0.840 | 0.720 |
| 1.50 | 0.870 | 0.330 | 1.205 | 0.498 | 0.953 | 0.495 |
| 2.00 | 1.020 | 0.180 | 1.430 | 0.385 | 1.065 | 0.270 |
| 2.50 | 1.170 | 0.030 | 1.655 | 0.273 | 1.178 | 0.045 |
The numerical results confirm the theoretical findings. In particular, the investment in a safety warning system is an effective instrument that not only improves the demand for electric cars but also changes the nature of price competition. If the warning system is sufficiently powerful, the electric-car maker can become a price leader without sacrificing demand.
4. Managerial Implications
The results of this article provide several important managerial implications for electric-car manufacturers and battery suppliers.
First, R&D mode selection should be based on a formal assessment of R&D capability rather than on industry fashion. Cooperation is often praised as a route to synergy, but it is the equilibrium choice only when both parties are relatively weak. If one firm has a clear capability advantage, the superior firm should lead the R&D project. In particular, an electric-car manufacturer with strong in-house battery expertise should avoid entering a cooperative agreement with a much weaker supplier because the manufacturer will bear most of the R&D cost while sharing the resulting profit.
Second, suppliers should think carefully before accepting a delegation contract. A supplier with superior R&D capability can earn higher profit under independent R&D than under delegation or cooperation. When the supplier’s capability is intermediate, however, it may be optimal to let the manufacturer take the role of developer. This counter-intuitive result is explained by the fact that the manufacturer’s R&D improves battery-pack demand and thereby increases the supplier’s wholesale profit.
Third, safety anxiety is not simply a demand killer for electric cars; it also influences the strategic pricing position. When consumers’ trust in battery safety is high, an electric-car maker can choose either price leadership or price followership depending on cost considerations. When safety anxiety is severe, the electric-car maker should generally follow the fuel-car price, because a low price acts as a compensating mechanism.
Fourth, investment in a battery safety warning system can be used proactively to alter the structure of price competition. A high warning-system investment raises consumers’ perceived safety of electric cars and shifts the leadership equilibrium. The electric-car manufacturer should evaluate the optimal \(T\) jointly with the pricing strategy rather than treating safety investment and price decisions separately.
Fifth, government agencies and industry associations should pay attention to information transparency about electric-car battery safety. Since consumer safety anxiety is partly driven by accident reports and media coverage, credible safety-verification programs and public data platforms can increase \(\theta\), making consumers more confident in electric cars. A higher \(\theta\) benefits the electric-car industry and also intensifies competition, which ultimately lowers prices for all car buyers.
5. Conclusion
This article has investigated two connected operational decisions for electric cars: the choice of battery R&D mode and the selection of a competitive pricing strategy under consumer safety anxiety. In the first stage, I developed a dyadic supply-chain game with a battery supplier and an electric-car manufacturer. Comparing the manufacturer self-development mode, the supplier-development mode, and the cooperative mode, I showed that R&D capability is the key driver of the mode choice. Both firms prefer independent R&D when their own capabilities are strong, whereas they prefer cooperation when their capabilities are weak. A win-win consensus in favor of manufacturer self-development arises when the manufacturer is strong; a consensus in favor of supplier development arises when the supplier is strong; and cooperation is chosen only in the low-low capability zone.
In the second part of the article, I introduced consumer safety anxiety into a duopoly pricing model with an electric car and a fuel car. Three price games were analyzed: simultaneous, electric-car-led, and fuel-car-led. The results show that both price leadership and price followership can be equilibrium outcomes when battery-safety trust is high. If consumer safety anxiety is strong, the fuel-car manufacturer tends to be the price leader while the electric-car manufacturer becomes the follower. A safety warning system, modeled as an investment \(T\), can mitigate anxiety and raise electric-car prices and profits. However, the effect depends on the level of \(T\). Only when the investment level is sufficiently high is the electric-car maker able to lead the market profitably.
There are natural extensions of this research. First, the model could be generalized to consider multiple battery suppliers with different capabilities and pricing contracts. Second, one can introduce government policies, such as safety subsidies or consumer rebates, into the pricing game. Third, consumers are often concerned about charging convenience and resale value in addition to safety; a multidimensional anxiety framework would capture a fuller picture of electric-car adoption. Finally, empirical studies could calibrate the consumer safety parameter using survey data from real electric-car markets. These extensions would further enrich the understanding of electric-car supply chains and provide more precise decision tools for managers and policymakers.
