Collaborative Governance in Tackling Technical Barriers to Trade—A Study on the Traction Battery Pack Industry

In my research, I focus on how government and non-government actors jointly respond to technical barriers to trade (TBT) affecting China’s traction battery pack exports. As the global movement toward zero-carbon accelerates and countries roll out policies supporting the traction battery pack industry, international competition has intensified. The formal entry into force of the EU Battery Regulation in August 2023 added numerous TBT-related requirements, expressing a new wave of green trade protectionism. Drawing on the multi-subject collaborative governance theory, I analyze institutional fragmentation, value divergence, and fragmented governance mechanisms embedded in the current response system.

China’s traction battery pack sector has become a global leader in terms of production scale and supply-chain integration. Lithium batteries—a central product category of the broader traction battery pack family—ranked among China’s “new three” export items in 2023. However, the industry still faces serious issues in carbon footprint accounting, mandatory recycling quotas, and battery passport disclosures set out in the EU regulation. My thesis examines the current state of affairs faced by Chinese enterprises exporting traction battery pack products, explains the weaknesses in coordination among various administrative bodies, and proposes a multi-tiered pathway for building collaborative governance networks. The governing process should include value alignment—between safety and development—as well as institutional innovation and shared technical infrastructure.

1. Introduction and Research Rationale

The present research began from my observations at the intersection of trade policy, environmental governance, and public administration. Global markets are experiencing an increase in complex technical regulations, standards, and conformity assessment procedures. In particular, the traction battery pack—the core component of electric vehicles—has become a central arena for both innovation and regulatory competition. The international landscape for traction battery pack is shifting from cost-driven to regulation-driven competition.

In 2023, the EU adopted its new “Regulation on Batteries and Waste Batteries,” which directly overturned previous practice. Whereas earlier provisions were framed under a directive—leaving more national latitude—the new regulation binds all member states directly. This established new technical guidelines for carbon footprint declarations, supply chain due diligence, battery passport information disclosure, and mandatory minimum content of recycled materials in new batteries. Since the EU is one of the top destinations for China’s traction battery pack exports, the direct impact of the measure is substantial.

From my own professional perspective as a researcher in trade governance and customs administration, the response to TBT in China needs to go beyond simply waiting for official consultation and complaint procedures. The one-dimensional “government-only” paradigm is insufficient for addressing the structural nature of the new trade barriers. Instead, I found that building a proactive, multi-subject system involving central ministries, local governments, industry associations, research institutes, enterprises, and international counterparts is both necessary and feasible.

1.1 Research Background

China’s traction battery pack sector underwent extraordinary growth from technological infancy to market maturity in less than two decades. According to data I compiled from official statistical databases, the installed capacity of China-made traction battery pack products continues to grow at double-digit year-on-year rates. Battery manufacturers have expanded beyond domestic boundaries, exporting to Europe, Southeast Asia, the Americas, and the Belt and Road Initiative partner countries.

Yet international success invites regulatory tension. In the past five years, more than one-third of TBT notifications submitted to the WTO relate to environmental objectives. The European Green Deal set net-zero emission targets for 2050, and the EU battery regulation is a central pillar of this strategy. The purpose of my study is to examine whether the state machinery for handling TBT is sufficiently collaborative to protect the development of the traction battery pack sector from unnecessary and disproportionate trade restrictions.

The research found that by 2023, China’s lithium battery exports had exceeded 252.9 billion RMB for the first ten months alone, accounting for 1.3 percent of total national exports. Under such trade dependence, the consequences of non-compliance with emerging requirements are enormous.

Therefore, my dissertation responds to the urgent need for better coordinated policy approaches. It explores how government, enterprises, industrial associations, and international bodies can jointly construct an effective and responsive mechanism for TBT management.

1.2 Research Significance

The theoretical importance of my research lies in introducing collaborative governance into the analysis of TBT management processes. Previous research on TBT often focuses on technical standards, testing methods, conformity assessment, or industrial policy. Seldom are such issues framed as a failure of multi-actor public management. By contrast, I argue that the management of TBT—especially for a strategically important sector like the traction battery pack—can be better understood as a case of collective-action problem requiring public and private actors to work together across traditional bureaucratic boundaries.

The practical significance is also evident. Institutional fragmentation increases costs and time delays. When the EU proposes a new regulation, China only has about sixty days to submit comments via the WTO TBT notification procedure. Without an efficient mechanism to collect input from relevant enterprises and experts, valuable time is lost. My survey data show that 91% of representative traction battery pack manufacturers believe that government agencies need to strengthen coordination. Many firms indicated uncertainty about which government department should be their primary point of contact.

The research offers a potential roadmap: establish a fixed coordinating office, integrate public information platforms, develop administrative supervision mechanisms, and align safety-with-development values across all parties.

2. Literature Review and Theory

2.1 TBT in Trade Governance

Technical barriers to trade encompass mandatory technical regulations, voluntary standards, and conformity assessment procedures that may create unnecessary obstacles to international trade. The WTO TBT Agreement requires members to ensure that technical regulations do not discriminate against imported goods and are not more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective, such as protection of human health or the environment.

Existing studies often treat TBT as binary: a legitimate instrument for protecting policymakers’ goals versus a disguised form of protectionism. I find that this dichotomy fails to capture the dynamic interplay between environmental regulation and global competition. Since the global financial crisis of 2008, developed economies have increasingly deployed TBT measures to give domestic industries strategic advantage while ostensibly pursuing climate goals. The emerging forms of TBT often manifest as “green barriers.” In this context, I consider TBT as an adaptive instrument with both regulatory and strategic dimensions.

2.2 Traction Battery Pack as a Strategic Industry Framework

In this thesis, the term “traction battery pack” covers the entire assembly system—battery cells, modules, battery management system, thermal management, and mechanical housing—designed to provide traction power to electric vehicles. I deliberately use the full term rather than merely “battery” in order to highlight its systemic, high-technology nature and its export policy significance. Public policies promoting the traction battery pack involve not only economic competitiveness but also energy security and CO2 mitigation.

Data from SNE Research show that in 2023, Chinese companies represented about six of the top ten global positions by installed capacity of traction battery pack. The industry has successfully created a vertically integrated domestic supply chain comprising raw materials, precursors, cathode and anode materials, separators, electrolytes, cell fabrication, and recycling operations.

However, strategic industry status also makes it prone to external regulatory targeting. When national industrial champions become dominant in emerging technologies, trading partners often apply TBT as neutral-looking instruments with disproportionately restrictive effects.

2.3 Multi-Actor Collaborative Governance Framework Used

From a theoretical perspective, my dissertation applies multi-actor collaborative governance theory, which extends from collaborative governance theory advanced by scholars such as Ansell and Gash. Collaborative governance is defined as “a governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative and that aims to make or implement public policy or manage public programs or assets.”

I identify four key features of this multi-actor collaborative governance approach:

(1) Pluralization of actors. In the TBT domain, actors include not only central ministries such as commerce, customs, industry and information technology, market regulation, and foreign affairs, but also local governments, industry associations, standardization organizations, third-party testing bodies, and individual enterprises.

(2) Public issue as the object. The governance object is a public issue, involving trade security, environmental sustainability, and industrial development, not private interests.

(3) Value consensus. Effective governance depends on shared beliefs, at least around core objectives, in this case, balancing safety, ecology, and market access.

(4) Process orientation. Governance arrangement emphasizes collaborative interactions, deliberation, institutionalized forums, and network building, not merely outcomes.

3. Status and Challenges of China’s Traction Battery Pack

3.1 Evolution of the International TBT Environment

During my analysis, I grouped the drivers of TBT evolution into three categories:

Geopolitical drivers—As global power competition intensifies, trade and technology policies are increasingly weaponized. The United States’ Inflation Reduction Act, for example, conditions tax credits for electric vehicles on final assembly in North America and battery component sourcing outside “foreign entities of concern.” Europe’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) similarly imposes carbon costs onto imports.

Technology drivers—The green transition is accelerating demand for emerging products like traction battery pack products. Technical standards followed by high-income countries increasingly demand lower carbon emissions, digital traceability, and closed-loop management. These standards often reflect local technological capacities, creating barriers for industries currently relying on fossil-based electricity.

Environmental governance drivers—The global consensus on decarbonization has made environmental sustainability a legitimate policy objective under WTO rules. However, legitimate objectives can be stretched to become protectionist measures. As I observed, the European Union has submitted a growing share of TBT notifications relating to environmental protection—over half each year since 2019.

The example of the EU Battery Regulation is very instructive. It has replaced the 2006 EU Battery Directive and switched the governance style from framework directive to one directly applicable in all Member States. The regulation specifies the following targets in the table below.

Regulatory Focus Implementation Dates Key Requirements Related to Traction Battery Pack
Carbon footprint declaration 2025 Each traction battery pack must be accompanied by a carbon footprint declaration prepared according to a delegated act
Carbon footprint performance classes 2026 Batteries categorized into performance classes to enable comparison
Maximum lifecycle carbon footprint threshold 2028 Batteries exceeding threshold are prohibited from being placed on the market
Recycled content in new batteries 2031 Minimum shares of recycled cobalt (16%), lithium (6%), nickel (6%)
Recycled content in new batteries 2036 Minimum shares of recycled cobalt (26%), lithium (12%), nickel (15%)
Battery passport 2027 Digital record with sustainability, durability, and due diligence information
Producer responsibility From entry into force Producer or importer is responsible for waste collection, treatment, and reporting

3.2 Regulatory Case Study: The EU Battery Regulation

In this section, I examine the EU Battery Regulation’s impact on traction battery pack exporters from China. The regulation creates new obligations:

Carbon Footprint Calculation. The regulation recommends using the Product Environmental Footprint methodology for calculating GHG emissions. The specific formula for the product carbon footprint (PCF) is given as

$$PCF = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left( AD_i \times EF_i \right)$$

where \(AD_i\) denotes the activity data of process i and \(EF_i\) denotes the emission factor of the corresponding energy input, material, or transport. In practice, a traction battery pack has a complex supply chain. Roughly 80% of its carbon footprint is produced by suppliers rather than by the final assembly plant. Thus, to calculate the carbon footprint accurately, the exporter must trace material and energy flows upstream through multiple tiers of suppliers.

In China, the calculation is particularly difficult because the national primary energy mix is highly dependent on coal, and the average carbon emission factor for electricity (approximately 0.58 kg CO2/kWh) is higher than that of the European grid. If a Chinese traction battery pack producer purchases green electricity via bilateral power purchase agreements, the emission factor can be reduced, but the certificate system for green electricity attributes is not yet internationally recognized.

Recycling and Recycled Material Requirements. The EU battery regulation demands minimum recycling efficiencies for lithium, cobalt, nickel, and copper. The recycling efficiency target for lithium is 75% by 2026 and for cobalt, nickel, copper 90% by 2026. In the second stage from the end of 2031, the regulation targets even higher efficiency levels, significantly above the current EU average. The regulation also imposes recycled content quotas:

$$R_{min,j,t} = \frac{m_{recycled,j,t}}{m_{total,j,t}} \times 100\%$$

In this formula, \(R_{min,j,t}\) is the minimum recycled content of metal j at time t; \(m_{recycled,j,t}\) denotes the mass of recycled metal j in the traction battery pack; and \(m_{total,j,t}\) is the total mass of metal j. The quotas refer to “钴、锂、镍” which in English are cobalt, lithium, and nickel.

Chinese recyclers possess advanced technical capabilities, sometimes capable of recovering more than 99% of nickel, cobalt, and manganese, yet they cannot necessarily source sufficient end-of-life batteries from Europe or other foreign markets because cross-border movement of waste batteries is regulated under the Basel Convention and often prohibited by domestic waste import rules.

Battery Passport and Data Disclosure. A battery passport requires the disclosure of data along the whole life-cycle, including information on the battery manufacturer, individual battery characteristics, carbon footprint, responsible sourcing, materials composition, repairability, and dismantling information. This raises concerns for Chinese manufacturers who worry about exposing proprietary data on cell chemistry, cathode composition, and supply chain reliability. The risk of industrial espionage becomes substantial.

3.3 Critical Gaps Identified for Chinese Traction Battery Pack Producers

(1) Carbon footprint accounting system underdeveloped: no national carbon footprint database for traction battery pack products has been officially established; electricity carbon emission factors and green certificate accounting lack detailed provisions to avoid double counting; the primary grid average is used rather than marginal emission factors; and there are no internationally recognized carbon border adjustment mechanisms mutually accepted by China and the EU.

(2) End-of-life management system fragmented: waste battery flow often goes to unregulated small recyclers rather than the formal system; the definition of “retired traction battery pack” is blurred with “solid waste”; import policies for recycling overseas retired batteries remain restrictive—the Ministry of Ecology and Environment still lists spent batteries under the Prohibited Solid Waste Import Catalogue.

(3) Information disclosure risks: without local battery passport standards and safe data hosting protocols, forced disclosure under the EU regulation might threaten strategic information.

(4) Standard system not fully internationalized: China has not incorporated its traction battery pack standards into bilateral or regional trade arrangements. FTA and RTA notification levels dealing with TBT cooperation are much weaker than those developed by the EU and the United States.

4. Governmental Responses and the Problem of Fragmentation

4.1 Overview of Public Actors and Instruments

From the institutional point of view, TBT response functions in China are dispersed. I describe them as the following tiers:

(1) Identification and Consultation. Under the WTO TBT Agreement, China maintains a National Notification and Enquiry Point administered by the General Administration of Customs. Affected enterprises can ask domestic authorities to clarify ambiguous foreign measure provisions through the enquiry point.

(2) Notification and Comment. During the sixty-to-ninety-day comment period after a WTO member issues a TBT notification, Chinese authorities, industry associations, and enterprises can submit formal objections if the proposed rule is discriminatory, unnecessary, or unscientific.

(3) Specific Trade Concerns (STCs). If a TBT has entered into force and continues to cause problems, an affected WTO member can raise a Specific Trade Concern at the TBT Committee. The purpose of raising an STC is to seek clarification or modifications of the measure through bilateral dialogue.

(4) Trade Negotiations and Dispute Settlement. The Ministry of Commerce coordinates trade negotiations and disputes; it is often engaged only when formal channels are blocked.

In reality, I find there is no consolidated “whole-of-government” approach. For example, the TBT National Notification and Enquiry Centre under the General Administration of Customs is competent for notification. However, the network for collecting input from industry is underused. Similarly, the Standardization Administration under the State Administration for Market Regulation runs the TBT notification comment center in parallel, causing overlapping duties. The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology has the closest ties with industry associations, but it lacks formal authority to lead TBT response. The Ministry of Commerce is responsible for external representation, but it is not involved in day-to-day TBT monitoring. This fragmentation leads to missing response deadlines and inefficient allocation of technical expertise.

4.2 Problems Identified: A Survey-Based Analysis

To empirically verify the above-mentioned bottlenecks, I conducted a dual-track questionnaire from August 2023 to December 2023. One questionnaire targeted enterprises in traction battery pack manufacturing, including lithium battery cell makers, battery system integrators, and recyclers. Another targeted government officials and experts from commerce, customs, MIIT, and market regulatory authorities.

From the 160 valid enterprise questionnaires, I found that:

Indicator Proportion of Responses Interpretation
EU considered a primary market 46.9% EU is the largest or second largest export destination
EU considered a source of TBT 48.1% Enterprises experience TBT most from the EU
EU Battery Law has high impact 76.0% Manufacturers expect direct trade disruption
Acknowledge need for interagency coordination 91.0% Enterprises view fragmented procedures as problematic
Request common online platform 71.2% Demand for centralized digital services

Looking deeper into the enterprise data, I found that most enterprises did not understand the pathway for sending comments on EU regulatory drafts. Only a small number of large stated-owned or foreign-invested companies had specific teams tracking global battery regulation. In particular, small and medium-sized battery-packing companies supplying to electric vehicle producers were poorly aware of carbon footprint rules and battery passport requirements.

From the 105 valid responses from government officials, I observed a recognized but not yet operationalized need for inter-agency cooperation:

Result Data Interpretation
Central role of multiple ministries Responses evenly distributed across ministries Recognition that TBT response crosses silos
Inter-ministerial cooperation required 65% stated that their ministries are necessary but need others’ support Widespread awareness of interdependence
Lack of stable coordinating unit Nearly all official responses identified “no fixed lead agency” as a central deficiency Structural gap persists

The cross-tabulation revealed an interesting mismatch: enterprise officials identified ASEAN as a significant source of TBT, while government officials considered EU and US as the most probable sources. The gap suggests that government agencies may underestimate difficulties in emerging economies resulting from customs procedures, weak infrastructure, and poor implementation of transparency obligations. Awareness strategies should therefore reflect a more realistic picture of TBT conditions across various regions.

4.3 Problems Identified from Theories and Interviews

Issue 1: Lack of holistic response. Existing mechanisms operate in a linear fashion, often initiating action only after a measure has been finalized. But modern TBT measures such as the EU Battery Regulation develop over several years with multiple delegated acts. To be effective, the response must begin much earlier, during the rule-shaping stage. This requires constant monitoring, early warning, ex-ante impact assessment, and technical preparation—tasks currently not assigned to any single consistent unit.

Issue 2: “Belt and Road” policy not supported. The Belt and Road Initiative emphasizes standards connectivity. Yet coordination among BR countries in the TBT domain remains superficial. Many partner countries have not established mutual recognition agreements for testing results and certification for traction battery pack products. Without a coordinated TBT strategy, Chinese enterprises investing in these markets suffer from redundant testing and approval processes.

Issue 3: Weak embedding of TBT in RTA/FTA structures. Analyzing the free trade agreements that China has signed, I notice that early agreements contain very thin TBT chapters. The deeper provisions are missing; for instance, no clear obligation on technical consultations. Compared with the EU or CPTPP, Chinese FTAs rarely include regulatory coherence mechanisms, or commitments on information exchange of proposed technical regulations before they are officially notified to WTO. Thus, when an FTA partner is about to design a regulatory framework for traction battery pack products, China has limited influence over the design stage, and can only react to the final regulatory proposal at the WTO forum.

4.4 Root Cause Analysis Based on Multi-Actor Collaborative Governance

In this subsection, I analyze the root causes of the problems identified in the TBT response in relation to the traction battery pack industry.

First, value divergence across public actors. In the multi-actor collaborative governance network, the alignment of values is essential. In the TBT context, the “value conflict” is often framed as a choice between public security and economic development. Once the parties adopt instead a shared view—that security and development are complementary—they can better support common policy.

Currently, for many local protectionist “passive” actors, the value orientation tends to be narrow. Some administrative units treat TBT compliance simply as an after-sales service function of the customs administration. They miss the bigger picture: responding to TBT is about the survival and upgrading of the national strategic sector—the traction battery pack. Without that shared notion of “security for development” and “development for security,” fragmented governance persists.

Second, ambiguous collaborative governance mechanism. The official meeting system—the inter-ministerial joint conference for TBT—has been inaugurated, but no fixed body, no special budget, and no professional staff support it. Administrative supervision and performance appraisal mechanisms are weak. The functions of the joint conference are duplicated by other ad hoc task forces, rendering the system ineffective.

Third, governance fragmentation caused by division and lack of digital integration. Various agencies have constructed their own databases and websites. However, they do not share data with one another efficiently. At the enterprise level, it is hard to know from which website to obtain early warnings or guidance. This fragmentation harms the quality and efficiency of the TBT response.

5. International Comparison of Coping Strategies

To formulate more concrete suggestions, I compared the European Union and the United States.

5.1 EU Institutional Synergy

In the EU, the TBT notification and enquiry point is located in the Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs (DG GROW). The integrated Administrative Cooperation (ADCO) groups convene national authorities. DG GROW ensures a single point of responsibility for the process. DG Trade operates the Access2Markets portal, a central web portal for trading information. The Single Entry Point receives complaints raised by companies and is connected to the Commission’s network of market access advisory committees. The EU approach shows a centralized model with highly professionalized coordination.

5.2 US Model: Cross-Agency and Ad-Hoc Task Force

In the United States, the Department of Commerce (DOC), through its International Trade Administration (ITA), serves as the chief coordinator. Under the Trade Agreements Compliance Program, the ITA establishes a “TBT unit” responsible for collecting and analyzing comments and filing specific trade concerns. During the investigation of a technical barrier, the DOC interagency task force coordinates various departments, including USTR, State Department, and the Consumer Product Safety Commission. To strengthen private sector participation, the US government funds the “Market Development Cooperator Program,” providing technical assistance to industry associations and standard-setting organizations.

5.3 Lessons for Collaborative Governance in My Framework

Feature United States European Union Proposed for China
Lead agency DOC / ITA DG GROW / DG TRADE Permanent State Council Coordination Unit
Information platform Trade Compliance Center Access2Markets Unified National TBT Digital Platform
Private sector participation Industry associations Enterprise Europe Network, Single Entry Point Innovation alliance among battery producers
Funding Market Development Cooperator Program EU structural funds Dedicated annual budget
Administrative supervision Regular performance review Regulatory Scrutiny Board Annual performance reporting to State Council

6. Improved Multi-Actor Collaborative Governance Pathways

Drawing on the earlier theoretical discussion and international comparative insights, I propose a three-dimensional system for optimizing the TBT response in the traction battery pack industry.

6.1 Value Alignment: Balancing Security and Development

The first step is to nurture and institutionalize a common value orientation across all participating actors. The government must act as an active value “shaper” rather than a passive responder. On the one hand, TBT measures can be seen as necessary risks to green transition and environmental sustainability; on the other hand, they might represent protectionist devices hampering legitimate trade of traction battery pack products. In my view, a “dual carbon” perspective and national strategic industry protection are not contradictory. To reduce carbon emissions, China must develop its own capability to standardize lifecycle carbon accounting, promote renewable energy procurement, and improve battery recycling rates. Thus, complying with certain premium environmental standards can become an opportunity to upgrade the external competitiveness of China’s traction battery pack. The coordinated message is that TBT is not only a challenge to be defended against, but also a force for domestic ecological industrial upgrading.

In order to institutionalize this shared value, I recommend establishing a standing inter-agency working group at the State Council level with a clear charter, authority, and budget. This group should meet monthly to evaluate early signals from the WTO TBT committee, the EU, the US, and emerging markets. Its mandate would not be to duplicate the functions of individual ministries, but to synchronize their efforts into a coherent proactive response.

6.2 Institutional Mechanism Alignment and Administrative Incentives

Institutionalization requires clear assignment of responsibilities. The inter-agency working group should create TBT response procedures for different stages: listening, commenting, raising STCs, negotiating, and cooperating on standard alignment. These procedures should be defined in terms of standard operating procedures.

To strengthen vertical and horizontal coordination, local governments should embed TBT response capabilities into their functions, with local commerce and customs departments serving as co-leads for the traction battery pack sector. Industry self-regulation and self-discipline are important; the government may entrust the industry association to operate a TBT monitoring team for the traction battery pack industry, on a government procurement basis.

The administrative supervision mechanism can be based on a clear set of performance indicators, such as number of comments submitted, percentage of comments adopted in revised measures, average time for responding to enterprise complaints, number of training sessions, and number of early warning reports issued. The government should provide rewards and recognition for units that meet targets and sanctions for those that are lethargic.

From a governance perspective, effective incentives are at least as important as administrative orders. An annual “TBT Response Excellence Award” for enterprises and individuals can foster ownership and serious participation.

6.3 Governance Technology Alignment: Shared Public Information Platform

The most tangible proposal from my survey is to establish a unified national public information platform. This platform should integrate:

Module Content
Real-time TBT monitoring and translation Multi-language database connected to WTO IMS, national notification systems, and regional registers
Expert database Searchable profiles of battery chemists, test engineers, sustainable finance specialists, legal experts
Industry early warning AI-assisted alerts tailored by HS codes, product classification, and destination markets
Complaint and consultation One-click submission of enquiries, comments, STCs; tracking system
Training materials and simplified guidance User-friendly manuals for small and medium-sized enterprises on carbon footprint, battery passport, recycling compliance

When users access the platform, they should be able to filter the database by product type, export destination, issue type and timeline. The platform must be developed in compliance with national cybersecurity regulations and trade-secret protection policies. It is particularly important to include a protected data-sharing environment, allowing manufacturers to upload confidential production data for regulatory simulation while ensuring data integrity is not breached.

From a digital governance perspective, the platform contributes to governance modernization by enabling whole-of-government visibility over TBT-related processes. Real-time analytics allows policymakers to identify patterns in non-tariff measure trends. Automatic notification to relevant industrial associations ensures no key comment period is missed.

In summary, the proposed technical solution set includes unified data standards, shared services, smart analytics, and feedback loops between the central platform and local sub-platforms. The immediate priority should be to consolidate existing disparate websites, such as the WTO TBT SPS national notification and enquiry point, the Ministry of Commerce technical guides portal, the enterprise service platform of market regulation agencies, and the industry association webpages, into one logical portal.

7. Detailed Strategic Recommendations for Traction Battery Pack Export

In this section, I move from structural proposals to sector-specific action plans.

7.1 Building National Carbon Footprint Management Capacity

One of the most pressing tasks is to develop a Chinese national database for the traction battery pack life cycle assessment. The database should include emission factors for key materials—such as lithium carbonate, nickel sulfate, cobalt sulfate, cathode precursor, anode material—based on domestic production conditions. When a Chinese manufacturer uses a mixture of recycled and virgin materials, the emission factor should reflect the actual material flow.

$$EF_{battery} = \frac{\sum_{i} m_i EF_i}{\sum_{i} m_i}$$

I am using this formula to highlight that the battery carbon footprint is a mass-weighted average of emission factors of each material and process. To provide accurate results, the database must be regularly updated based on verified company data.

At the national level, the government should provide funding to laboratories and research institutions for conducting life cycle analysis. This database can form the foundation for bilateral recognition negotiations. China may conclude mutual recognition agreements with the EU for carbon footprint verification, carbon border adjustment mechanisms, and green power certification.

In the medium and long term, China and other non-EU countries should coordinate on common carbon calculation rules for “green battery” production. I argue that Chinese experience in large-scale manufacturing and recycling can contribute to international standards, as Chinese manufacturers have learned to reduce carbon emission per kWh substantially by using renewable energy and optimizing energy efficiency.

7.2 Improving Waste Battery Collection and Recycling System

To meet the EU recycled content requirements, Chinese traction battery pack manufacturers need access to a sufficient volume of end-of-life batteries. Therefore, I recommend an integrated policy campaign:

First, establish a robust national traceability and monitoring system for retired power batteries. At present, enterprises are required to register their batteries in a national monitoring system, but the enforcement is uneven. Legislation should upgrade this registration from administrative rule to a government regulation that carries a penalty in case of non-compliance.

Second, define clear legal standards for import and export of retired battery modules. This includes distinguishing between waste and reusable second-life battery units. If a retired traction battery pack can be reassessed, repurposed, and resold, it should not necessarily be treated as hazardous solid waste. Customs should agree upon clear criteria with the environmental authority, so that lawful imports of second-life battery packs for remanufacturing can proceed.

Third, encourage Chinese enterprises to invest in overseas battery recycling facilities or partnerships. Access to foreign retired batteries will be easier if the recycling operation is closer to the source, within the country of use. The National Development and Reform Commission and Ministry of Commerce should provide overseas investment guidance and risk warnings for such projects.

7.3 Creating a “Battery Passport” Data-Sharing Ecosystem

I consider the “battery passport” as both a regulatory threat and an opportunity for digitalization. Rather than treating disclosure obligations as an imposition, Chinese stakeholders should design a domestic interoperability framework that allows enterprises to prepare battery passport data once, and then adapt it to the specific data schema required by each importing country. In other words, a “Shared Data Layer” for battery information could be created using open standards (e.g., digital product passports under ISO/IEC standards). The shared data layer should include:

Data on environmental footprint—aggregated carbon footprint, water usage, and resource efficiency;

Data on material composition—critical raw materials and recycled content share;

Data on durability and repairability—state-of-health indicators, expected lifetime, disassembly instructions;

Data on supply-chain due diligence—the declaration of conflict-free minerals and responsible sourcing policy.

To achieve this, China should accelerate the development of a national technical committee on traction battery pack digital passports. The aim is not only to satisfy the EU regulation but also to design dynamic systems for trade facilitation. For instance, when a Chinese traction battery pack is exported to Africa or Southeast Asia, the same digital passport will improve market access by providing standardized information to local customs and end-users.

7.4 Strengthening Global Standardization and Cross-Regional FTA Strategies

One of the more powerful policy recommendations stemming from my comparative analysis is to increase efforts for embedding TBT provisions into trade agreements. I recommend that China systematically reviews each of the 22 existing FTA partners and propose a “TBT Plus” annex for the traction battery pack sector. The “TBT Plus” annex should include obligations such as:

Commitment to align domestic technical regulations with international standards where appropriate;

Mechanism for exchanging draft technical regulations before the WTO notification period starts;

Mutual recognition of conformity assessment results for electrical safety, EMC, and environmental performance;

Creation of a sectoral bilateral sub-committee on lithium batteries and electric vehicle components;

Adoption of a “positive list” of harmonized standards for the traction battery pack.

This proactive embedding strategy will give China more influence on emerging regulations before they are hardened. It also allows the Chinese government to introduce progressive regulation as a standard-setter—including its new low-carbon battery standards.

I also propose to share China’s TBT compliance capacity with emerging economies along the Belt and Road. By offering technical assistance, best-practice training, and financial aid to our partners for developing their battery safety and sustainability standards, we simultaneously open markets for Chinese traction battery pack products.

8. Public Value and Trade Diplomacy

The international TBT environment for traction battery pack products is not limited to laws and regulations; it also involves public diplomacy. Diplomatic dialogues at the bilateral level should be used to explain the scientific justification for China’s electricity grid emission factors and green power certificates. Trade counsellors from Chinese embassies should be trained to gather information on proposed legislation at an early stage and transmit it quickly to the coordinating unit.

In the WTO forum, China should make more frequent use of Specific Trade Concerns. Raising STCs not only on existing EU or US regulations, but also on notifications by emerging economies, alerts partners that we do not blindly accept opaque regulations. The WTO TBT Committee meetings should be used as a regular mechanism for “regulatory coaching,” where opaque regulatory design is questioned on the basis of international standard-setting principles.

From the perspective of public value theory, the objective of trade diplomacy is to create a legal and policy environment in which a legitimate product—traction battery pack that supports low-carbon mobility—is not unduly excluded from markets. Thus, environmental policy and free trade are unified.

9. Final Thought on Governance Mechanism Sustainability

In any system, collaboration is seldom automatic. The persistence of efficient governance depends on the development of repetitive patterns, stable structures, and shared norms. To secure the operationalization of multi-actor collaborative governance in TBT response, I recommend building a “triple-loop” learning mechanism:

First-loop: immediate feedback from the public information platform concerning specific measures;

Second-loop: annual review of the overall TBT response performance across all relevant actors;

Third-loop: strategic adjustment of the industrial policy and trade policy based on systematic observation of global trends.

This learning loop ensures that the governance system is not static. When the EU changes its battery passport schema, the Chinese platform can trace the change, update the data architecture, and organize training within weeks. This is an optimal way to operationalize resilience.

The ultimate purpose of my doctoral research is not merely to produce procedural recommendations, but to improve the ability of the Chinese state to secure a fair position for its strategically critical high-tech products—exemplified by the traction battery pack—in global markets despite the turbulent geoeconomic environment. I believe that collaborative governance, both state-society and interagency, is the correct theoretical and practical path to build such resilience.

As a closing remark, I emphasize my key finding that the TBT response is not a simple bilateral negotiation issue. It should be reflected in the industrial life-cycle management, regulation-making process, standards development, public service support, and global diplomacy of the traction battery pack industry. It requires centrally aligned value, strong organizational architecture, and modern technological platforms—all three reinforcing each other. I hope that the multi-actor collaborative governance model discussed in this thesis will serve as a useful reference for other strategically important industries in China.

 


Appendix A: Selected List of Questions from Enterprise Survey

In my enterprise survey, key dimensions included:

  • Perceived severity of the EU Battery Regulation and its specific impacts on the traction battery pack export;

  • Identification of carbon footprint, recycling rates, and battery passports as most severe obstacles;

  • Evaluation of governmental support and inter-agency coordination; and

  • Preferences for future government policy interventions (standard alignment, financial incentives, and public information platform).

Appendix B: Government Officials Survey Method

For government respondents, I asked open questions on:

  • Institutional ownership of TBT response tasks;

  • Necessary partnerships to improve response;

  • Observations on information flows;

  • Causes of failed coordination.

These responses enriched my understanding of the bureaucratic barriers to collaboration.

 

Further details from the official and industrial statistical sources used to support my study are provided in extensive tables within the main text. Please see the corresponding sections of each chapter for the full analytical tables.

At last, I emphasize again that all of these data-driven reform proposals are ultimately about securing the social license of traction battery pack products in global trade. Collaborative governance is not an end in itself but the means to deliver both national strategic security and global environmental progress.

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